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In trucking and commercial vehicle cases, plaintiffs’ counsel frequently asserts that a commercial driver should be held to a higher standard of care than other motorists sharing the road. However, while this argument often references special licenses, training, and regulations, it is inconsistent with Georgia law. The standard of care does not change based on the type of vehicle a person drives. Rather, every driver is held to the same benchmark: ordinary care under the circumstances.

Where this really matters is not just on liability, but on damages, especially when the “higher standard” theory is used to pursue attorney’s fees. The idea typically goes like this: because a commercial driver is expected to exercise specific care, any lapse is inherently more blameworthy and therefore rises to the level of “bad faith.” However, this argument fails when the principles of Georgia law are correctly applied. A commercial driver is not held to a heightened duty in the first place, and therefore, their conduct cannot be retroactively elevated beyond negligence simply because of their professional status

The Rios v. Norsworthy, 266 Ga. App. 469 (2004) decision makes the first half of that clear. In Rios, the trial court instructed the jury in a way that suggested a commercial driver owed a higher duty of care. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that this was improper and constituted reversible error. The takeaway is straightforward: you cannot raise the standard of care based on a driver’s commercial status. That principle closes the door on any argument that starts with “they should be held to a higher standard.”

The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Love v. McKnight, 321 Ga. 196 (2025) provides context in the case of attorney’s fees as well. In Love, the Court rejected the idea that ordinary traffic violations, even admitted ones, are enough to show “bad faith” under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Instead, the Court clarified that bad faith requires something more than negligence: conduct that is intentional, reckless, or reflects a conscious disregard of consequences.

Viewed together, those cases significantly narrow this common plaintiff strategy. If a commercial driver is not held to a heightened standard (Rios), then their conduct cannot be judged against one. And if bad faith requires more than ordinary negligence (Love), then the distinction cannot be bridged by the assertion that a commercial driver “should have known better” or “should have acted more carefully.” This approach effectively seeks to establish a higher duty of care, a position that remains unsupported by Georgia law.

In practical terms, opposing counsel can no longer use a commercial driver’s training, licensing, or regulatory environment as a substitute for the specific evidence required to seek attorney’s fees. The fact that a driver is a CDL holder does not transform negligence into bad faith. Without evidence of intentional wrongdoing, recklessness, or conscious indifference, § 13-6-11 is not in play. Arguments to the contrary risk doing exactly what both Rios and Love prohibit: elevating the legal standard in a way that the law does not recognize.

At bottom, Georgia law keeps the framework consistent. Ordinary care governs liability, and bad faith requires something beyond ordinary negligence. Attempts to use a commercial driver’s status to blur that line, whether to increase liability or to justify attorney’s fees, are not just unsupported. They are legally improper and, if presented to a jury, may constitute reversible error.

Update from:

• Foss Baker, Atlanta Partner

This article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult with an attorney to discuss your specific legal situation.