29 December, 2025
In: Articles and Clients alerts
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The landscape of tort reform continues to be shaped in state appellate courts, where the constitutional validity of legislative damage caps is constantly being tested. While historical political campaigns set the stage, recent judicial decisions highlight how courts are currently grappling with the tension between a jury's determination of damages and a legislature's power to limit them. These rulings provide critical insight into the present and future direction of personal injury and medical malpractice law.
A recent decision from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Mohebali v. Hayes, provides a prime example of a state court upholding tort reform measures against constitutional challenge.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued her obstetrician for ordinary negligence arising from her care during pregnancy. Her pregnancy advanced to 43 weeks and 5 days (well past the normal 40-week period) and resulted in fetal demise. A jury awarded the plaintiff $7.5 million in actual, non-economic damages. However, the trial court reduced this award to $656,730.00 pursuant to North Carolina's statutory cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions, N.C.G.S. § 90-21.19(a).
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Legislative Cap violated her right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 25 of the North Carolina Constitution.
The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendants did not become a vested property right until 2019, years after the Legislative Cap was enacted in 2011, she had no right to an unlimited remedy. A right is considered vested if it is fixed, absolute, and not subject to future legislation; therefore, the plaintiff never had a vested right to an unlimited award.
Crucially, the court emphasized that the General Assembly has the power to define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable without impairing the right to a jury trial. While the jury correctly performed its function by determining the facts and the value of the harm (the $7.5 million award), its job stops there. The court explicitly relied on precedent holding that legislative caps simply establish the outer limits of a remedy, which is a matter of law and not a matter of fact for the jury. Because the cap limits the legal remedy and not the jury’s factual finding, the court concluded that the cap does not infringe upon the constitutional right to a jury trial.
The Mohebali ruling, which upheld a drastic reduction in compensation, is part of a broader trend of increased difficulty for plaintiffs seeking large financial awards for non-economic damages. In jurisdictions like Texas, the legal landscape has become notably more restrictive for personal injury claims.
Current legislative changes in states like Texas indicate that fewer plaintiffs are securing large financial awards for personal injury claims, with a decline in successful outcomes over the past decade. This is driven by several factors, including courts demanding stricter adherence to proving negligence (requiring clear evidence that a party owed a duty, breached that duty, and that the breach directly caused the losses); aggressive defense tactics by insurance companies and defense attorneys that contest claims more aggressively, making settlements harder to reach and contributing to longer case durations; and statutory constraints enacted through tort reform measures, such as proposed bills in Texas like HB 4806, which seek to impose even tighter constraints on damages for non-economic harm, echoing the effect of North Carolina’s Legislative Cap.
The convergence of judicial support for legislative caps (as seen in North Carolina) and the tightening of procedural and evidentiary standards (as seen in Texas) points toward a legal environment that places a higher premium on rigorous defense strategy and statutory compliance.
The Mohebali decision serves as a powerful reminder for defense counsel to carefully review and apply all available statutory defenses. The court’s analysis highlighted that the plaintiff could have potentially avoided the cap by pleading gross negligence instead of ordinary negligence, as the cap's exception does not apply to verdicts where the trier of fact finds both permanent injury and that the injury was suffered as a result of gross negligence. The plaintiff's choice of legal theory and subsequent failure to preserve the argument for gross negligence ultimately allowed the cap to stand.
This article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult with an attorney to discuss your specific legal situation.